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CONSTITUTIONAL

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LAW-CONFORMITY
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AND RELEASE PROCEDURES OF THE INSANE.

THE

COMMITMENT

State v. Clemons,

515 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1973).

The Arizona Supreme Court stated in a recent decision that
the commitment and release procedures for criminally insane persons
must conform with those used for the civilly insane. The matter was
raised by an inmate of the Arizona State Hospital. He alleged that admission and release provisions established by Arizona statute differed
for the criminally and civilly insane and discriminated against persons
committed after acquittal on criminal charges by reason of insanity.
The person civilly committed to a mental institution is granted a
full hearing, at which he may introduce and examine witnesses who
testify as to his sanity. The criminally charged mental patient has no
separate hearing.' The Arizona release procedure differs as well.
The civilly committed patient may be released upon a conclusion of
sanity reached by the superintendent of the hospital or as a result of
the patient's filing a petition for declaration of his soundness of mind.
In contrast, the criminal patient is left with the burden of proving his
sanity ,to a jury.2
The Arizona court concluded that the procedures clearly differed,
and that the safeguards afforded civil patients must be extended to
those who plead not guilty by reason of insanity to criminal charges.
Where these safeguarding procedural similarities do not exist, there is
a constitutional violation of the equal protection clause. In citing precedents, the Arizona court examined the decision of Baxstrom v. Herold,3 wherein the United States Supreme Court stated:
[E]qual protection does not require that all persons be dealt
with identically, but it does require that a distinction made
have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made. . . . Classification of mentally ill persons as
either insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of
custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance
whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether
a person is mentally ill at all.
1. ARiz. REv.STAT. § 36-514 (1958).
2. Id.
3. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 US. 107 (1966),

4, ld, t 111,
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Arizona believes the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that where substantial differences in commitment or release procedures for criminal and civil patients exist, the equal protection clause
applies. It has, therefore determined its procedural statute to
be unconstitutional. 5
Where does Oklahoma stand in an analysis of procedural equality
for criminally and civilly mentally ill patients? Do Oklahoma statutes
institutionalize and release all patients on equal terms, or do they, like
Arizona statutes, grant the state a lessened burden of proof at criminal
commitments and force a greater burden of proof on the criminal patient at the time of release?
A comparison of the procedures involved shows a clear dichotomy
between civil and criminal release. The civil release may be acquired
by petition from the patient, a relative, or the hospital superintendent.
Two qualified examiners must testify as to the competency of the patient before the judge can declare the person legally sane. 6 For a criminal patient, however, the release procedure is vague in that he is to
be "kept as a patient until legally discharged" 7 but the statute does not
delineate the procedure for such discharge. When committed by a jury
which finds the accused too incompetent to stand trial, he will be confined to a state mental hospital until he is discharged and released as
presently sane by the superintendent of the hospital.8 Neither the patient nor his family may petition for examination. 9 Thus three avenues
of release are open to the civilly committed mental patient while the
criminal patient is afforded but one, one which is tenuous at best.
The commitment procedure offers similar substantive difference.
In civil commitments court certification is required and provides for a
hearing to make an examination of the alleged mentally ill person.' 0
The examination is conducted by a sanity commission composed of two
doctors and one licensed attorney. Following this examination, a hear5. AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1621.01 (1956). Most relevant aspect of statute:
If the defendant is found guilty at the first trial, there shall be a second trial
following promptly after the first trial. At the second trial, the jury shall
consider the defense of insanity and, if appropriate, the defendant's present
mental condition with regard to commitment to a mental institution. The court
may convene a separate hearing for the purpose of receiving evidence relevant
to the issue of punishment, and at such hearing the punishment in capital cases
shall be fixed.
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43a, § 75 (1971).
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1161 (1921).
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1167 (1963).
9. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43a, § 54 (1971).
10. OKLA, STAT, tit. 43a, § 54 (1971),

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss2/10

2

Phillips: Constitutional Law--Conformity in the Commitment and Release Proc

1974]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

hag is held at which a report of the sanity commission is presented.
This statuOnly then can the patient's current sanity be evaluated.'
tory procedure applies to all involuntary civil commitments but does not
apply and is not utilized in criminal proceedings where a defendant alleges insanity.
An Oklahoma jury, upon finding an individual not guilty by reason
of insanity, can peremptorily have him detained as a mental patient until legally discharged.'" In permitting such an action, Oklahoma is allowing the jury to state that the defendant is of sound enough mind
to stand trial, but must still be committed to a mental hospital. The
formal sanity hearing, so fundamental in civil procedure, is markedly
absent.
Oklahoma has avoided solving the problem of substantive procedural variance. In 1945 the Criminal Court of Appeals, in Rice v.
State, called for the legislature to enact laws which would assure the
mentally ill criminal defendant a sanity hearing,' 3 and yet nothing has
been done.
Equal protection is guaranteed to every American through the
14th amendment. If the civil patient has three avenues of release
available to him, the criminal defendant must also be afforded the same
rights. If the civil admittee is guaranteed a sanity hearing at the time
of the commitment, such must also be available to the criminal. As
long as all persons are not given equal procedural safeguards in the
commitment and release procedures from mental institutions, the equal
protection clause of the constitution is being violated.
William R. Phillips
11. Williams, Is a Defendant Entitled to a Civil Sanity Hearing Prior to Commitment. . ., 43 OKLA. B. ASS'N J. 292 (1971).

12. Rice v. State, 80 Okla. Crim. 277, 158 P.2d 912 (1945).
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